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Abstract 
The present study was designed to examine the variations in criminal justice expenditures 
across states in relation to crime, measures of political party membership, and several control 
variables that also attempt to explain both property and violent crime. The year, 2009, was 
chosen for the analysis. Data in the present study were collected by Olugbenga Ajilore (2016) for 
the year 2009 and supplemented with other state level data. The Ajilore dataset is one of the few 
datasets that has reliable criminal justice expenditure data across states, which is also 
disaggregated by type. Criminal justice expenditure data is actually quite difficult to collect 
across states and is not widely available across states particularly over consecutive years/time. 
The dependent variables in the current study is the crime rate, which is separated into two 
categories; violent and non-violent crime. Both variables are important and essential in 
understanding the effects of police expenditures and political influences. The independent 
variables are correctional direct expenditures, judicial and legal direct expenditures, police 
protection expenditures, state legislative composition, state control, and governor’s party. Each 
of these variables either measures the level of expenditures on crime control, or measures factors 
that may influence the level of expenditures on crime control. The control variables are 
imprisonment, population age, unemployment rate, poverty rate, education, and foreign born. 
These six control variables are utilized to accurately account for the other possible factors 
leading to the effect of police expenditures on crime.
vii 
 
An OLS regression of each criminal justice expenditure on crime was conducted in three 
models: expenditure/threat Hypothesis Models; expenditure/political party model, and reduced 
form models. Three equations were estimated for each model to help assess the effects of the 
independent and control variables on property and violent crime independently. The criminal 
justice expenditures were used in separate models due to collinearity. Models for total criminal 
justice expenditures were also estimated to address collinearity between individual criminal 
justice expenditure measures. 
The study found that though Republican states increase criminal justice expenditures, this 
does not deter or decrease crime. The minority threat is also lightly supported in relation to 
politics and crime which lacks evidence to support the claim of Blalock’s minority threat 
hypothesis. There is an economic threat that can be seen in the reduced crime models that may 
indicate that there is in fact a power threat with Republican states. These findings display 
evidence of social control through politicians, mostly Republicans as the reduced crime models 
show an increase in poverty and criminal justice expenditures as crime increases. Lastly, the 
deterrent theory was seen to fail in this study as this research revealed that there is a positive 
relationship between politics and crime through criminal justice expenditures, specifically police 
expenditures. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
This research examines the potential relationship between political structure, police 
expenditures and the volume of crime across US states. Extant theories and some research 
suggest that crime can be deterred by criminal punishments, or by police enforcement, or the 
concentration of policing.  It can be argued that decisions to direct criminal justice expenditures 
toward enhanced policing or the increased use of imprisonment are political decisions, and that 
these decisions may reflect attitudes toward what are assumed to be the “best” methods for 
controlling crime held by members of different political parties (i.e., democrats versus 
republicans). The current study addresses these issues by examining variations in criminal justice 
expenditures across states in relation to crime, measures of political party membership, and 
several control variables that also attempt to explain crime. To do so, this study utilizes data on 
police expenditures, minority threat, crime, and several control variables from Olugbenga 
Ajilore’s 2016 study which focused on police expenditures and crime in the year 2009. This 
research will employ data from 2009 for all 50 US states. The data will include measures of 
political representation, such as the number of republicans and democrats in the Senate and 
House of Representatives in each state, as well as the governor’s political party membership. The 
variable Police Expenditures will be the primary independent variable of interest, and the crime 
rate the dependent variable. The crimes that will be assessed will be drawn from the Uniform 
Crime Report. Control variables will examine other potentially relevant processes, such as, 
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racial composition, age structure, policing, unemployment rate, education, foreign born 
(immigration), prison, and poverty. 
The relationship between the political structure, police expenditures, minority threat, and 
crime has not been widely examined in the criminological literature. Few criminological studies 
specifically examine whether police expenditures, for example, affect crime (see chapter 2). 
Some suggest that part of that effect may occur through what is called “minority threat,” or the 
minority threat hypothesis. It is widely recognized, for example, that the rate at which minorities 
are migrating into the United States is increasing. Despite research indicating otherwise, many 
politicians and citizens believe that immigration has a positive relationship with crime, meaning 
that as immigration increases, crime increases as well. Therefore, the minority threat becomes 
apparent on a Congressional level, which may lead to an increase in state police expenditures, 
depending on a state’s political representation or the political party membership of legislative 
officials across states. As a result of such myths about crime and its causes, some politicians may 
believe that the expanding police expenditures will have a negative effect on crime, therefore, 
controlling the minority threat. 
The current research focuses on exploring state level hypotheses concerning whether 
police expenditures and political party membership across states affects crime rates. It is 
hypothesized the republican states spend more on criminal justice system expenditures, police 
expenditures specifically, on that democratic and split states, resulting in a decrease in crime. 
Theoretically, republicans are known to be more conservative and punitive than the democrats. 
For example, Beckett (1999) argued that in the US, Republicans politicized imprisonment, and 
used a “get tough on crime” approach in an effort to attract White voters who were concerned 
with crime away from the Democratic party. The different stances of the two parties toward 
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crime and its control offers different responses to crime that stress attitudes toward crime control 
policies, immigration, unemployment, and so on. Hence, the two parties may differ regarding the 
relationship between social control and crime. Many politicians agree that there needs to be 
social control – but at what level?  How much social control is needed? What forms should it 
take? Should politicians’ direct expenditures toward the prevention of crime by enhancing 
policing? Or by efforts to deter crime or incapacitate criminals by expanding expenditures on 
imprisonment?   
Making these kinds of decisions is not necessarily based on empirical evidence and is 
acknowledged to be affected by ideological assumptions about factors that cause and prevent 
crime that vary across political parties.  Therefore, the current research will argue the social 
conflict theory and assumptions about deterrence theory help identify social control in relation to 
politically advised state police expenditures and crime. Three types of expenditures will be 
measured in this study to assess the relationships between social control expenditures and crime: 
corrections, judicial and legal, and police protection direct expenditures. Identifying three types 
of expenditures allows an assessment of whether one or all of these expenditure patterns appears 
to be related to the level of crime. Theoretically, it is assumed that increased expenditures 
enhance social control, which leads to a decline in crime. Part of the focus of this thesis is to 
assess whether there is evidence that this assumed relationship works in practice controlling for 
other explanations of crime.  
To address these issues, Chapter 2 examines prior and similar literature related to the 
current study. The chapter examines the theoretical aspect as it focuses on the deterrence theory, 
social control theory, and introduces the relationship between economic and power threats with 
police expenditures. Chapter 2 also elaborates upon political actions (police expenditures, 
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political threat, political influences on society, etc.), supporting literature, current arguments, and 
a synthesis. Chapter 3 discusses the methods used in the current study. It acknowledges the 
variables used, the regression, sources, of variables, and detail of why the variables have been 
chosen to be implemented in this study. The chapter also obtains information of supporting and 
rivaling factors that support each variable as it elaborates and defines the expenditures and data 
being utilized. 
Chapter 4 introduces the different models utilized in the current study: Threat Hypothesis 
Models; Political Models; and Reduced Form Crime Models. Analysis accounting for 
collinearity for both property and violent crime is also discussed. The results report the 
description of the findings from each model related to each hypothesis or theory being tested.  
The current study assessed three primary hypotheses related to various theoretical 
arguments examined in a later chapter. These arguments test political explanations or arguments 
about the relationship between politics and crime that are often assumed to be true, but which 
have not been widely tested.  For instance, deterrence theories argue that crime control efforts of 
various types that increase the likelihood of apprehending and punishing offenders can reduce 
crime.  In prior studies, this has been tested by examining the relationship between crime and 
various kinds of criminal justice expenditures. As expenditures increase, crime should decrease. 
In political terms, it is often assumed that Republicans are tougher on crime than Democrats.  It 
can be hypothesized that if this assumption is correct, one would expect crime to be lower in 
Republican controlled states. Politically, states are controlled by political parties at different 
levels – by having, for example, a Republican governor, or senators, or a majority of senators 
from one party. Thus, there are different ways to measure political party control to test a 
hypothesized relationship between politics and crime. Other studies suggest that the level of 
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crime reflect efforts to control threats to those in power.  In other words, in this view, crime 
would be related to the presence of populations that provide threats to the powerful. These 
groups could be represented by low income, or racial or ethnic minorities. Arguments supporting 
each of these general hypotheses are reviewed in chapter 2.  The data, variables and methods of 
research are discussed in chapter 3. The analysis of the various models are presented in chapter 
4. Chapter 5 summarizes and makes sense of the findings. 
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Chapter II: Review & Theory 
 This chapter will examine the prior literature and the theories related to the current 
research. The first area that will be addressed is the theoretical background concerning factors 
that cause or produce crime, with particular emphasis on theory relating social control to crime 
rates. There are two theories that are related to the study, which are deterrence theory and the 
social conflict theory. Deterrence theory will be connected to the general issues regarding the 
social control of crime to understand the increase or decrease in crime and social control 
amongst US states. Social conflict theory will be examined to understand and highlight the 
differences between the political parties’ views and their methods for social control. This 
includes the examination of their response to the minority threat, conservative and liberal views, 
and the ongoing combat on the congressional level, as to who might have the power to expand 
the police expenditures. The theories’ assumptions will be elaborated upon as a connection to 
social control and police expenditures.  
The second area will address the prior literature. After each theory, a review of related 
research will be presented to provide a summary of the empirical findings. The findings will 
connect the assumptions of each theory to the study and provide a base for the current research.  
Deterrence Theory 
 Deterrence theory was created in the 18th century by Caesar Beccaria and Jeremy 
Bentham (Akers, 2013). The theory suggests that the more a punishment is certain, swift, and 
severe, the more it will deter crime. For example, if a person notices that almost everyone who 
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attempts to shoplift is arrested, charged, and sentenced to prison, the theory argues that it will 
deter the people who witnessed or knows about those incidents and outcomes.  The extent to 
which people may be deterred is also related to their knowledge of and perceptions of the 
likelihood of being caught and punished, the severity of the sentences, as well as how swiftly 
offenders are prosecuted and sentenced, or processed through the criminal justice system.  
Certainty relates to the probability of being caught and punished for the crime that one 
commits. If the probability (certainty) of one being caught is very high, this should increase 
deterrence. Celerity is the swiftness of punishment. Swift punishments are argued to increase the 
deterrent effect of punishment.  Lastly, severity is the level of punishment in terms of harshness. 
To act as an effective deterrent, the punishment must be perceived to be greater than the rewards 
from the crime.  
Review of Literature 
 Paternoster (2010) simply explains deterrence as being the omission of crime due to the 
fear of punishments or sanctions. Paternoster examined the deterrence of crime through sanctions 
and the theoretical connections presumed by the deterrence process. Paternoster’s discussion of 
the literature on deterrence suggests that punishment has a marginal deterrent effect. He goes on 
to note that the increase in the number of police has a deterrent effect on some crimes, and that 
there is some evidence that incarceration has some limited impact on some forms of crime as 
well.  With respect to imprisonment, however, the majority of offenders who are incarcerated 
recidivate, indicating that the effect of incarceration on those send to prison is minimal.  
As Paternoster noted, deterrence theory suggests that an increase in the certainty and 
celerity of imprisonment is believed to reduce the level of crime. Paternoster’s review of the 
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literature, however, suggests that findings from relevant studies did not provide evidence that 
either the length of prison sentencings or the celerity of punishment deterred individuals from 
committing crime. 
 Paternoster presents two arguments in relation to the reduction of crime by the increase of 
police. Several studies have been conducted to understand the effects of the increase of police 
officer’s presence on crime in targeted areas. Part of the impetuous for some of those studies 
arose after President Bill Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act in 
1994 which focused on the increase of deterrence. The Act moved to increase the police force by 
100,000 street officers and enforce harsher sentencing laws, and tougher gun restrictions, 
therefore, increasing certainty in targeted areas (Paternoster, 2010). The enforcements of the Act 
were presumed to increase deterrence by increasing the certainty of detection, as the presence of 
police officers made it more certain that criminals would be apprehended during or after the 
commission of a crime (i.e. burglaries, property theft, homicide, etc.).  
James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland (1978) were the first to conduct a study on police 
presence and its effect on crime. They found that crime did, in fact, decrease in cities where the 
police presence increased. Robert Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen (1988) found similar effects 
across cities. However, it was later found that while crime decreased in targeted areas, crime 
increased in neighboring areas where police presence was not enhanced (i.e., there was a crime 
displacement effect).  This leads some researchers to believe that crime did not completely 
decrease as crime was displaced -- criminals just began to commit crimes in other locations (e.g., 
around the corner, in the next neighborhood) until the increase in police presence program was 
over.   
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A number of studies address the effect of what is called “hot spot” policing on crime 
(e.g., Sherman and Weisburd 1995; Braga 2001; Braga and Bond 2008).  Braga, Papachristos 
and Hureau (2014) performed a metanalysis of hot spots policing research.  Their results suggest 
small impacts of hot spot policing on crime in local communities; that the use of problem 
oriented policing responses in crime hot spots had larger impacts than the traditional method of 
simply increasing police presence; and that communities near areas where policing was increased 
also showed declines in crime.  
Based on his review of these studies, Paternoster (2010) argued that some researchers 
believe that the decrease in crime was not in relation to the increase in police presence but was 
also affected by the occurrence or perceptions of misconduct by police, and that police in 
experimental areas where perhaps also with-holding crime reports. Paternoster noted that the 
latter form of police misconduct was found after surveying several high-ranking officers and 
receiving statements that inferred that several departments withheld from reporting events to 
reduce the recorded crime. The lack of crime reporting may have helped to display a decrease in 
crime when, in fact, the recorded crime decline was a product of police crime reporting behavior. 
Other researchers argued that despite knowledge of under-reporting of crime by police, one can 
still not disprove that the certainty of detection was not partially responsible for the decrease in 
crime observed.  
Because targeted policing has some effect on increasing detection and arrests, it might 
also increase convictions and the number of offenders being sent to prison. As a result, one might 
argue that targeted policing also enhanced the volume of punishment, or the level of 
incarceration. Regardless of whether enhanced policing increases punishment, there has been a 
long-term increase in the use of imprisonment in the US, beginning in 1973.  That increase has 
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been rather large.  In 1973, the incarceration rate was about 98/100,000.  By the incarceration 
rate had doubled compared to 1973; by 1993, the incarceration rate was about 370/100,000, 
increased to about 480/100,000 by 2003, and in 2013, was again approximately 480/100,000 (US 
Bureau of Justice Statistic 2013). Thus, over this forty-year period, the rate of incarceration had 
increased by 4.9 times, and it has been argued that this increase in incarceration helped produce 
the crime drop that began in the early 1990s (Leavitt 2004; for criticisms of that argument see: 
Farrell 2013; Lynch 2007; Ouimet 2002). William Spelman (2000) and Steven D. Levitt (1998) 
found some support for the hypothesis that incarceration causes a decrease in crime. Spelman 
concluded that from 1990-2000, approximately 4% to 21% of the decrease in crime was 
explained by the increase in incarceration (severity). Levitt (1998) concluded during that same 
period, approximately one-third of the decrease in crime was in relation to the increase in 
incarceration. Thus, both researchers agree that the increase of incarceration (severity) played a 
small role in the decrease of crime. Paternoster (2010) argues that the effect of incarceration on 
crime varies by type of crime, and that the reduction in crime was mostly among less serious 
crimes, leading him to suggest that the severity and volume of punishment may not have had an 
effect on deterring one from crime, while certainty may have had an effect. 
Lastly, when discussing the deterrence and the decrease of crime, one looks at celerity. 
Celerity, again, is noted as the swiftness of punishment. Unfortunately, little research has been 
conducted to fully understand the effects of celerity on crime rates. The swiftness in this research 
would relate to the processing in the criminal justice system (e.g. Apprehension, arraignment, 
trial, plea, sentencing, etc.). Though it is known that the criminal justice process does take time 
to sentence an individual, the effects amongst several cases are unknown. Therefore, celerity will 
be omitted in this particular review and current study. 
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In sum, deterrence theory suggests that increasing police presence, the type of policing 
employed, and the use and extent of incarceration may, through various mechanisms, lead to a 
reduction in crime. The results from criminological research, however, suggest that these effects 
are limited, and impact some kinds of crimes but not others. To some extent, what criminologists 
know about the limited impact of deterrence, however, does not necessarily translate into 
effective social control policies, and despite research which suggests that, for example, 
imprisonment fails to deter (Raaijmakers et al. 2017), there remains a belief in the utility of 
deterrence.   
Social Control Theory 
 According to Clinard & Meier (2015) the purpose of social control is to insure or at least 
attempt to insure, conformity to norms and minimize adverse outcomes such as crime. One 
conforms to the norms of society by following laws, rules, and regulations. By conforming into a 
law-abiding citizen, crime is then minimized. This social control is looked upon by congressmen 
and women, law enforcement, as well as several citizens in the United States. Clinard and Meier 
continue, stating that there are two basic processes of social control, which are internalization of 
group norms and the social reaction through external pressures in the form of sanctions from 
others. Internalization of group norms are norms established within groups that may differ from 
the outside norms, such as police agencies have norms that are different than other agencies and 
civilian norms. Social reaction through external pressures in the form of sanctions from others is 
a societal reaction to laws and policies enforced by other groups. 
In relation to the idea of general deterrence theory, social control theory also suggests 
that the expansion of police expenditures should increase police presence and surveillance, 
12 
 
thereby increasing the likelihood of apprehension, and leading to a decrease in crime. How much 
money should be or is expended on efforts to deter crime through policing is a political decision. 
It has been suggested in prior studies such as Caldeira and Cowart (1980) that decisions about 
police expenditures may be affected by political party membership of decision makers, 
suggesting that the political party affiliation of a state’s senators, congressional representatives, 
or governor may affect whether those expenditures increase, decrease or remain constant. These 
expenditures may come as a proactive response to an increase in crime or may be a pre-active 
initiative to prevent more crime, and in both cases, may be affected by assumptions. 
Review of Literature 
Researchers who argue that the expansion of police expenditures is a proactive response 
toward crime lean more towards a social threat and social control hypothesis. The threat 
hypothesis states that there are two types of threats, economic and power threat (Blalock, 1967). 
According to Ferrandino (2015) the economic branch is instrumental which deals with mobility 
in the midst of competition, while the power branch focuses more on the social aspects of 
attaining and retaining power in regard to racial and ethnic minorities. Both derive from 
competition that result from a growing minority population, mobilizing and seeking more 
resources to attain resources and power from the dominant group in society, which in America is 
the White Population. This becomes the minority threat – the root of the economic and power 
threats. The minority threat occurs as the dominant group(s) feels threatened by the rise of 
minority groups (Sela-Shayovitz, 2009). Sela-Shayovitz states that the minority threat is the 
result of racial and ethnic divisions and perceived threats, which ultimately lead to efforts to 
enhance social control to constrain the perceived minority threat.  
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The class and economic threat have a strong correlation with incarceration. Several 
studies found a positive correlation between economic conditions and punishment rates by 
revealing a trend that shows that during periods of economic equality, there is also an increase in 
prison rates (Chiricos and DeLone 1992; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Melossi 1998). Though many 
may argue against the economic threat and its relationship with incarceration, research has 
proven that societies with greater economic stratification lead to an increase in imprisonment 
rates, which help reproduce an unequal class-based social order (Garland 1990; Jacobs and 
Kleban 2003). In relation to class and race, the mass expansion of incarceration was an attempt 
to restore social control in the 1960s and 1970s which caused African Americans to currently 
make up approximately three-fourths of the prison population (Abu-Jamal & Fernández, 2014). 
This also caused expanded surveillance in low-income areas, resulting in a higher arrest rate in 
low-income areas (Beckett & Western, 2001). 
In the sense described above, social control is a form of political power, since it requires 
political decision-making for implementation, and at the same time distributes resources while 
also influencing how the legal right to use force is employed and disbursed. It is unclear whether 
political representatives are believed to act on their own perception of threat, represent what they 
believe are the public’s perception of threat, or whether their political decisions represent an 
actual democratic process that represent some measurement of public consensus. Forty years 
ago, however, Jacobs and Britt (1979) argued that policing, one of the routine expressions of the 
state’s monopoly on legitimate violence, was one of the ways in which the “control agents of the 
state” apply legitimate violence and force in ways that reinforce existing power relationships and 
the unequal distribution of power within society. Regardless of which of these processes occurs, 
Ferrandino (2015) suggests that the increase in social control represents the efforts of Whites to 
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maintain power by fracturing mobilization and consolidating resources. Ferrandino goes a step 
further to state that Whites even promote stereotypes of minorities by conveying and stressing 
negative and threatening characteristics of minority groups through a variety of media. In 
relation to the current study, Ferrandino (2015) argued that minority discrimination would 
increase this response by the dominant group, and a cycle emerges. As part of this cycle, 
stereotypes about the link between minorities and crime, which in the first place were created by 
unequal law enforcement and social control in minority communities, becomes widespread and 
more institutionalized.  Through this process, the original premise that minorities represent a 
threat is reinforced and legitimized, and justifies police targeting policies of minorities and low-
income areas. These statements are supported by the findings of Gove, Sullivan, and Wilson 
(1998) and Liska, Chamlin, and Reed (1985) found that in cities with higher percentages of 
minorities, particularly African-Americans, have higher arrest rates even when the crime rate is 
held constant. This also provides support of the Beckett & Western (2011) and Ferrandino 
(2015) studies which found that African Americans and low-class people are being targeted by 
politicians and authorities.  
Researchers such as, Corzine, Creech, & Corzine (1983) supported Blalock’s (1967) 
threat hypothesis. Blalock argues that nonlinear increases in minority concentration can lead to 
economic discrimination by Whites due to their perception of Black threats to White levels of 
resources (Parcel, 1979). This can occur on a micro and macro level with both economic threat 
and power threat, as Whites discriminate against African Americans through different responses 
(i.e. politics, law enforcement, media, etc.; Blalock, 1967). Blalock expresses his argument by 
first discussing competition and discrimination. This competition arises with the increase of 
minorities where it is then perceived by Whites that they may lose power, become challenged for 
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jobs, and challenged for land, the control and ownership of corporations, and so on. With the 
perception of competition, Whites feel as though a minority group can become more organized 
and change the social system that is structured to oppress minorities. This displays the structure 
of a system in which both race and class hierarchies intersect.  Addressing this race-class 
intersection, Blalock argues that middle-class Whites should have a greater prejudice toward 
African Americans than lower-class Whites, since the threat to middle-class White’s from Black 
advancement would be greater than the threat Black advancement poses to lower-class Whites. 
In other words, middle-class and high-class White have more to lose from the rise of minorities 
than low class Whites. 
Furthermore, Blalock (1967) argues that an increase in the minority population should 
result in an increase in discrimination. For in terms of power, political discrimination (restriction 
of minority vote, voting behavior of dominant group, etc.), symbolic segregation (Jim Crow 
laws, sit-ins, separate facilities and utilities, etc.), and the threat-oriented ideologies (belief 
systems of dominant group pushed upon minority group(s), differing belief systems, differing 
traditions, etc.) come into play as Whites continue to maintain power in society. However, 
Blalock does recognize that even within the dominant group, there are differences that result in 
conflicts regarding the treatment of minority groups. The example given is the civil war and the 
treatment of African Americans in the North and the South of the U.S., with those differences 
being related to the more central role exploitation of slaves played in the maintenance of the 
South’s economy and the economic and political power of the Southern elite.  
Corzine, Creech and Corzine found evidence supporting the racial threat hypothesis in 
their study of lynchings in the southern US. They found that Blacks were more highly 
discriminated against and looked at as a threat in the South compared to other regions in the 
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United States. They examined lynchings and how Blacks were harshly treated and killed in 
relation to the threat of power that Blacks brought to the majority White race. Their findings 
suggest that in the South, there is more of a social threat and apparent need for social control for 
the majority race to hold their high-level positions. The majority race employs both formal and 
informal social control to maintain power. The researcher’s findings of social control and social 
threat regarding power of the majority party is interesting to find and is noted to determine if the 
same threat of power lies within the reason of police expenditures in this current study. 
However, researchers such as Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002) studied the 
political threat hypothesis, economic threat hypothesis, and the threat of Black hypothesis and 
did not find any empirical support for any of the related hypothesis. Utilizing county-level data 
from South Carolina (i.e., NIBRS data, race-specific voting data, and demographic data), they 
found support for the minority threat hypothesis related to Black crime rates, but not for the 
political or economic threat interpretations of the Black threat hypothesis. 
Using data from Phoenix (1950-1988), Nalla, Lynch & Leiber (1997) assessed three 
competing theories of police growth: public choice, conflict, and organizational constraints. 
During the study period, Phoenix was the home to a large Hispanic population and a growing 
industrial base. However, evidence of Blalock’s symbolic segregation argument was blatant 
amongst the city as Nalla et al. (1997) states that in some neighborhoods, there were three 
barbershops: one for Whites, one for African Americans, and one for Hispanics. There were also 
different seating arrangements in movie theaters as the Whites sat on the theater’s main floor as 
opposed to African Americans and Hispanics who were to be seated in the balcony. From this 
display of separation, it would be assumed that a minority threat plays a role in the city. 
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The study assessed whether police expenditures were influenced by crime rates (public 
choice), racial, ethnic and class threats (conflict theory), and prior levels of funding 
(organizational constraints). Nalla et al. (1997) found a statistically significant relationship 
between race and police expenditures, as well as evidence of a class and an organizational effect.   
Politics and Criminal Justice 
 The sections above describe studies that have attempted to identify factors that affect the 
expansion and funding of criminal justice processes. Regardless of the specific explanations 
found above, each omits a discussion of the last necessary link in this process – that politicians 
must translate those influences into actions by voting, for example, increased criminal justice 
expenditures as a crime control response. Because this is true, politicians and various aspects of 
the structure of politics can affect responses to crime. 
It is widely recognized or assumed that Democrats and Republicans differ in their 
preferred reactions to crime, race, and policies. Republicans are known to be very conservative 
(Walker, 2014), and Democrats more liberal (Caldeira & Cowart, 1980). While there is some 
assumption that political parties and political party membership affects responses to crime, few 
studies have actually examined this important link in the crime-social control chain. Political 
party membership may, in other words, play a role in the kinds of crime-social control responses 
that emerge such as the level of funding for criminal justice agencies. It is also possible that 
political responses are toward crime-social control, because they are believed to be part of racial 
conflict and racial social control response due to perceived racial threats, which might be 
influenced by the racial composition of law-makers. This latter observation has rarely been 
examined in the criminal justice literature. 
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Multiple findings show that dominant groups often make successful demands to place 
additional law enforcement officers in cities with a high minority population (Jacobs 1979; Liska 
et al. 1981; Jackson, 1989). The additional officers are acquired through larger police 
expenditures. This was seen in 1990, when Former President Bill Clinton established a policy 
after promising to put 100,000 new police officers on the street to help reduce crime and increase 
safety and issuing a war on drugs (Marion, 1997). He proposed a budget in 1995 allocating for 
$17.3 billion for crime control and related law and judicial activities. Within the $17.3 billion 
proposed budget, $680 million was designated to finance the hiring of 100,000 new police 
officers. Acts such as this resulted in many minorities being arrested and incarcerated as a 
number of studies have found a relationship between minority threats and incarceration (Eitle et 
al., 2002). 
This relates back to Blalock’s political discrimination argument as the officers were put 
in low-income minority neighborhoods. As Ferrandino (2015) stated, it becomes justified 
through the media as it repeatedly reports and depicts minorities in a negative light. Political 
mobilization, economic competition, and the threat of Black-on-White crime have each been 
posited as distinct manifestations of racial threat (Blalock 1967; Liska 1987; Liska & Chamlin 
1984). The political behavior places more officers in minority neighborhoods while White 
officers are reportedly expected to use more force and make more arrest against minorities until 
White neighborhoods or cities become mostly minorities (Deslippe, 2004; B. W. Smith & 
Holmes, 2014; Stults & Baumer, 2007). With such a method that trickles down from the top of 
society, minorities face large barriers to move in order to gain a sense of power and economic 
equality. 
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Synthesis 
 The sections above reviewed explanations and studies that have attempted to discover 
factors that are related to the level and social control of crime. Traditionally, it has been widely 
assumed that the social control efforts offered by the criminal justice system manage the level of 
crime in society by deterring criminal offenders. While a significant volume of research suggests 
that criminal justice processes provide little to no real deterrent impact, politicians and the 
general public often assumes that criminal justice social control indeed constrains criminal 
behavior. As a result, there has long been a tendency to believe that controlling crime requires 
expanding formal, criminal justice social control. 
As noted, empirical evidence of a deterrent effect of criminal justice processes on crime 
has been limited. This leads researchers to explore alternatives to the deterrence argument which 
examine how perceptions of racial/ethnic and class threats influence expansion of the criminal 
justice system.  These alternative arguments suggest that the expansion of crime control is not 
about controlling crime, but rather is a method for reinforcing existing class and race power 
relationships. These studies have also discovered other factors that influence crime such as –
immigration, police expenditures, and education.  
 As pointed out above, missing from all of these explanations is a discussion that 
recognizes that regardless of which of these factors appear related to crime control, none can be 
implemented without the actions of political decision makers. Few studies have addressed this 
observation. While, for instance, prior research has found evidence of a power-threat hypothesis 
as proposed by Blalock, research has yet to explore whether the relationship between criminal 
justice control and power-threats are influenced by various dimensions of the political process 
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that affects the implementation of crime control, and whether those decisions relate to the level 
of crime. The relationship between politics and crime and the social control of crime can appear 
in a variety of ways. 
It is widely assumed that Republicans are tougher on crime than Democrats.  Thus, one 
might expect that there might be some relationship between political party membership and 
crime across US states. From a deterrence perspective, one could argue that states with a higher 
proportion of Republican legislators or which tend to have a Republican governor will be more 
likely to adopt a “get tough” on crime approach. That association has rarely been tested in the 
criminal justice literature. Moreover, if there is, as observed in prior studies, a perceived race-
threat effect on crime, is that relationship related to the political composition or political 
structure across US states? Related to this political structure/process question is whether the 
racial composition of political leadership within a state is also a factor that is related to the level 
of crime across states. It can be hypothesized that African American politicians, who are more 
likely to be Democrats than Republicans, have different attitudes toward crime and crime control 
than White politicians.  Thus, it is plausible that the percentage of African American politicians 
in a state might affect the rate of crime through the kinds of policies those politicians are more 
likely to support. These latter arguments about the effects of political parties and race and 
politics on crime have not been sufficiently addressed in the extant criminal justice literature. 
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Chapter III: Methods 
The purpose of the present study is to examine variations in criminal justice expenditures 
across states in relation to crime, measures of political party membership, and several control 
variables that also attempt to explain crime. This research aids the field of criminology in 
uncovering the possible causes and effects on crime. The different proactive policies and 
reactions by Democrats and Republicans may have a positive relationship with crime. 
Understanding the systematic effects, in relation to economic and power threats, will allow one 
to understand how politicians effect crime through the expansion of police expenditures. As 
politicians may began to feel threatened, they may increase the police expenditures to 
marginalize low-income and minority citizens, causing an increase of policing in low-income 
and minority neighborhoods.  
The current study has three hypotheses. (1) Theoretically, criminologist have widely 
assumed that political parties respond differently to crime. Compared to Democrats, Republicans 
take a “get-tough” approach to crime, which may decrease crime through various programs that 
Republicans tend to prefer. As a result, it can be hypothesized that states with greater Republican 
representation in the legislature, senate, and governor’s office may have lower rates of crime due 
to these “get-tough” approaches. 
 (2) Numerous studies suggest that crime may be deterred through increased surveillance 
and punishment of criminal offenders. Increased surveillance and punishment may require 
increasing criminal justice expenditures. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that an increase in 
criminal justice expenditures will cause a decline in crime
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(3) As reviewed in the prior chapter, previous studies suggest that the perception of threat 
has an effect on crime control strategies. Reflecting this argument, in the present study, minority 
threat is measured as the percent foreign born in each state, and it is hypothesized that as the 
percent foreign born increases, the threat they present increases, which leads to an increase in 
crime across states. 
In particular, this study utilizes data on police expenditures, minority threat, crime, and 
several control variables from Olugbenga Ajilore’s 2016 study which focuses on police 
expenditures and crime in the year 2009. In addition, gathered variables such as imprisonment, 
population age, unemployment, poverty, foreign born (immigration), education, registered 
voters, and the 2009 congressional composition (State legislative, Governor party, and state 
control) will be utilized to examine the relation to police expenditures and crime. 
This research area is lightly studied as the combination of criminology and political 
science is scarcely utilized. The present study attempts to reveal a political party’s influence on 
crime as Democrats and Republicans differ in perceptions, proactivity, and reactions to crime. In 
order to determine the effects, the present study will utilize the expenditures in 2009 across 50 
states to understand political influences on crime. Several variables will be utilized based on the 
use in prior and similar research. The study will conduct an OLS regression to assess the 
different relationships on violent and property crime. 
Data 
 The data for this study come from Olugbenga Ajilore’s 2016 study which focused on 
police expenditures and crime in the year 2009 across 50 states. Additional data for other 
variables such as imprisonment, population age, unemployment, poverty, foreign born, 
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education, registered voters, and the 2009 congressional composition (State legislative, Governor 
party, and state control) were collected to assist in the examination of the relation of politics and 
crime through police expenditures. All 50 states present their own individual crime rate and 
police expenditures. To assess the influence of the politics, congressional data were gathered for 
each state for the year 2009 to understand which political party had power and influence in the 
state, if any.   
Procedure 
 The processes of this study were to first find and gather data for the criminal justice 
system expenditures, threat and political variables. For the purposes of this study, after the data 
were collected from Olugbenga Ajilore’s 2016 study and other data sources noted in Table 1.1, 
the variables state legislative, state control, and governor were dummy coded to represent 
political control (0 = Democratic; 1 = Mixed; 2 = Republican). Three models were then created 
to assess the effects of criminal justice expenditures on property and violent crime rates across 
states. The expenditure variables were as follows: corrections direct expenditures (CE); judicial 
and legal direct expenditures (JE), and police protection direct expenditures (PE).  
 Several different models were estimated. Preliminary modelling indicated collinearity 
between several variables, leading to the need to estimate a large number of models to assess 
which variables appeared to be related to crime rates across states. Models were estimate for 
property and violent crime rates separately in order to examine whether the results varied by the 
general form of crime.   
 In the analysis chapter, Models 2 through 4 (including related sub-models, e.g., 1.1, 3.1a, 
3.1b, etc.), involved property crimes, while models 5 – 7 include the violent crime equations. For 
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both property and violent crime, there are separate models for: (1) the threat hypotheses (Model 
2, property crime; Model 5 violent crime); and (2) criminal justice expenditures controlling for 
political party membership variables (Model 3, property crime; Model 5, violent crime).  
Reduced form models for property crime (Model 4) and violent crime (Model 6) are also 
presented. Additional models (8, 9, 10) examine total expenditure models as an alternative 
method of estimating the models while addressing collinearity between the various criminal 
justice expenditure variables.  
 Several separate expenditure models were estimated. These models were estimated after 
initial regression analysis indicated multicollinearity between the independent expenditure 
variables. In addition, the expenditure variables were also highly related to the variable foreign 
born. To account for this, the foreign born variable also has its own model. 
 After creating the equations, control variables were chosen by relevancy, therefore, the 
median age variable was chosen over the variable “Under 18” and “18-44” for a more accurate 
estimate. Individual crime rates were gathered, such as robbery, burglary, murder, rape, etc., but 
here only the aggregate property crime and violent crime rates were examined.  
OLS regressions were conducted to analyze the models. Though most of the data were 
collected for 50 states, 49 were analyzed as Nebraska did not have information on the majority 
political party of the State House of Representatives (SHR), State Senate (SS), and the collective 
state control variables.  
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Variables 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this study is crime. Crime is measured using the FBI’S 
Uniform Crime Report data for the year, 2009. The data are reported as a rate per 100,000 
population. The crime rate in this study is separated into two categories; violent and property 
(non-violent) crime. Both variables are important and essential in understanding the effects of 
police expenditures and political influences. Both variables may differ as there are more non-
violent crime than violent crime. Additionally, there may be a different effect amongst both 
categories with respect to the police expenditures due to severity and frequency of crimes. 
Previous studies have shown that non-violent crime and violent crime may differ as one recalls 
that non-violent crime decreased as violent crime increased in the 1990s under the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act and other laws that pertained to overcrowding (Paternoster, 
2010). In the present study, non-violent crime is defined as burglary, larceny-theft, and motor 
vehicle theft. Violent crime is defined as murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault. Each are examined at a rate of per 100,000. 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables for this study are criminal justice social control expenditure s, 
state legislative party membership, Governor’s party, and state control. Each of these variables 
either measures the level of expenditures on crime control, or measures factors that may 
influence the level of expenditures on crime control. 
  
 
26 
 
Criminal Justice Expenditures.   
The criminal justice expenditures provide an understanding on how much the government 
invests into law enforcement agencies across the 50 US states. These expenditures are drawn 
from Olugbenga Ajilore’s 2016 study. The expenditures are examined through the criminal 
justice system budget and are grouped into three categories. The three categories included police 
protection, judicial and legal, and correctional direct expenditures.  
The police protection variable is the dollar amount, in 2009, that each state spent on 
police agencies and policing in the United States. The judicial and legal variable is the dollar 
amount each state spent into the courts and legal procedures in the year, 2009. Lastly, the 
corrections variable is the dollar amount, in 2009, that each state spent into the jails, institutions, 
and prison systems. Each expenditure category is measured in the dollar amount of money spent. 
In Ajilore’s study, expenditures are measured in direct expenditures and inter-government 
expenditures. The direct expenditures are the pay of employees, wages, materials, supplies, 
equipment, land etc., while indirect expenditures are the expenses to fund projects, functions and 
facilities. The present research will be focusing on the direct expenditures. 
State Legislative Party Membership 
 It has been argued that crime control strategies and expenditures on crime control may be 
affected by political forces, and therefore there is some need to control for the effect of political 
party membership across states to assess whether this effect is related to the level of crime across 
states. Three different political measures are used in this study: political party composition of the 
House of Representatives and political party affiliation of state senators in each state; the 
political party affiliation of each state’s governor; and the political party composition of the 
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House of Representatives, state senators, and the political party affiliation of the governor in 
each state, combined. 
 The state legislative variable is coded 0, 1, 2. For example, if the Republican party is the 
majority party in both the SHR and SS, the legislative control will be noted as Republican. This 
will be the same if the Democratic party was the majority party in both SHR and SS and noted is 
Democrat. However, if the Republican party is the majority in the SS and the Democratic party 
is the majority party in the SHR, it will be noted that the legislative control is Split. The variables 
will be labeled as; all Democrats (D=0), split (S=1), or all Republicans (R=2). Nebraska is the 
only state without recorded data for the SHR and SS in 2009. 
 Governor 
 The governor variable is taken from the National Conference of State Legislature 
database to understand the political party of the Governor of each state. The governor may be a 
Republican or Democrat. The Governor party variable is a binary variable which indicates the 
Governor’s political party, be it Democrat (D=0) or Republican (R=1). This variable will be 
combined with the legislative control variable to create the state control variable. For example, if 
the Governor’s party variable is noted to be Republican and the legislative control variable, 
Republican, the state control variable will be Republican. However, if the Governor’s party is 
Republican and the legislative variable is Democrat or split, the state control variable will be 
noted as, Mixed. The state control variable will be noted Democratic (D=0), a mixture of control 
(M=1), or Republican (R=2). 
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Control Variables  
There are six control variables for this research to accurately account for the other 
possible factors leading to the effect of police expenditures on crime. The control variables 
include imprisonment, population age, unemployment, poverty, foreign born, and education 
which are listed in Table 1 with description and sources.  
Imprisonment rate. The variable, imprisonment, is the rate of inmates in state prisons per 
100,000 population and is used to view a possible relationship between threats, police 
expenditures, and crime. This variable has been used in several previous studies by researchers 
such as Paternoster (2010), Garland (1990), Jacobs and Kleban (2003), and Abu-Jamal & 
Fernández, (2014).  
Age Structure of the Population. It has been widely noted that crime and age are related. 
To control for the effect of age on crime, the present study uses median age of the population of 
each state.  
Unemployment. The variable unemployment has been utilized in several studies and has 
been proven to have a relationship with crime by Melossi (1989) and Michalowski & Pearson 
(1990). Research indicates that this variable contributes to crime as unemployment rates have a 
positive relationship with crime rates and incarceration. Unemployment is the percentage of the 
population in each state that is unemployed. 
Poverty. Prior research has indicated a relationship between poverty and crime 
(Ferrandino, 2015 and Chambliss, 1994). Understanding low-income areas and the targeting 
areas allows for one to understand a relationship with crime. The over saturation of police in 
low-income and high crime areas may present a positive correlation with police expenditures, 
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political parties, and crime rates. In the current study, the variable is measured as the percentage 
of those living below poverty level in each state. 
Foreign born (immigration). Prior research has indicated a relationship between 
immigration and crime, although studies report conflicting results (Ousey and Kubrin, 2017). 
The threat hypothesis suggests that responses to crime and hence the level of crime may reflect 
perceptions of threats posed by immigrant groups. In the present study, immigration is measured 
as the percent of foreign born residents in each state.  
Education. Prior research indicates a potential relationship between education and crime 
(Chambliss, 1994). As education increases, crime is expected to decline. In the current study, 
education is measured as the percent of state residents with a high school degree or greater in 
each state.  
The sources for the control variables can be found in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 The Descriptions and Sources of the Current Study’s Control Variables  
Variable Description Source 
Imprisonment The rate of imprisonment is recorded by 
100,000 of each state. 
The Disaster Center Crime 
Page 
Population The population percentage is recorded by 
“under 18”, “18-44”, and median age in each 
state. 
U.S. Census Bureau  
Age and Sex Composition: 
2010 
Unemployment The unemployment rate is recorded by the 
annual average of each state. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Poverty The poverty variable is recorded as the 
percentage impoverished in each state. 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Poverty: 2009 and 2010 
Foreign Born The total percent of foreign born is recorded by 
the thousands for all races, collectively. 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Place of Birth of the 
Foreign-Born 
Population:2009 
Education The education variable consists of the 
percentage of High School education and more 
and Bachelor’s Degree or more. 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Educational Attainment in 
the United States: 2009 
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Chapter IV: Results 
 The following tables are the product of equations for the threat hypothesis (Tables 2.1-
2.4), political variables (Tables 3.1a-3.4b), and social control model (Tables 4.1-4.4).   
An OLS regression was run to estimate the first threat hypothesis model for property 
crime, which included all of the control variables and all of the expenditure variables. A 
variation inflation factor (VIF) was then estimated to assess whether the high zero-order 
correlation coefficients between the independent variables was affecting the OLS estimates 
through multicollinearity. It was also noted that in the initial OLS equations, the direction of the 
zero-order relationship between some of the independent variables and the dependent variable 
had changed, also indicating the possibility of multicollinearity between independent variables.  
The VIFs were examined to determine which of the variables were generating multicollinearity.  
The results suggested that there was a large correlation between the expenditure variables, with 
the zero-order correlations in some cases exceeding r = 0.90.   
Because the expenditures variables were of theoretical interest, a separate OLS model 
was run for each expenditure variable. These newly estimated equations for each separate 
expenditure variable still indicated multicollinearity and unstable regression coefficients. In the 
new models, the problem of multicollinearity occurred between each expenditure variable and 
the variable foreign born. Thus, the equations were re-estimated without foreign born.  In 
addition, a set of separate equations using the foreign born variable were also estimated to 
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address the problem of multicollinearity and to address the portion of the threat hypothesis 
related to the prevalence of foreign born populations.  
In short, in the analyses that follow, it was determined that separate models should be run 
for the threat hypothesis models and for each expenditure type (i.e., corrections, judicial and 
police). These models were estimated separately for property and violent crime.  
Property Crime Analysis and Models 
 This section reviews OLS estimates predicting property crime rates across US states. 
These estimates are examined in Tables (also called Models) 2.1 through 4.4. 
Model 2: Threat Hypothesis Models 
Variants of Model 2 examine the effects of criminal justice expenditures and threat 
variables on the property crime rate.  
Table 2.1 displays the corrections expenditures and control variables with property crime. 
The corrections expenditures have a positive correlation with crime, which implies that as 
correctional expenditures increase, property crime increases. Following deterrence theory 
arguments, this finding is not in the expected direction, and suggests that increased correctional 
expenditures does not deter crime across states, while controlling for possible threats. 
 The control/threat variables that were used in Model/Table 2.1-2.4 are: unemployment 
rate; median age; poverty; incarceration rate (prison); high school education and more (HS 
more); bachelor’s degree and more (BS more), and state control. The unemployment rate was 
used as an indicator of a class-threat (i.e., economically marginal people might be more likely to 
be arrested when perceived threats increase). However, unemployment did not display any 
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statistically significant relationship with property crime. A second class-threat indicator was 
poverty. Poverty was also not significantly related to the outcome.  
 In addition, none of the remaining control variables (population age, education, 
imprisonment) were related to the property crime rate. Finally, the political variable, state control 
which measured the degree to which a state was democratic or republican, was unrelated to 
property crime. In short, Model 2.1 indicated a significant, but unexpected relationship between 
correctional expenditures and crime, and no effect for measured threat or political factors.  
Table 2.1 Effects of Corrections Direct Expenditures and Threat Variables on 
Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .803, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Model 2.2/Table 2.2 is essentially the same as Model 2.1, except that the correctional 
expenditures variable is replaced with judicial/legal expenditures. The findings in Table 2.2 are 
essentially the same as in Table 2.1 – the only significant effect is for the criminal justice 
expenditure variable. However, once again, the effect is in the unexpected direction, and rejects 
the deterrence hypothesis 
 
 
Variable b se β P 
Corrections D.E. .124 .013 .786 **0.000 
Unemployment 6357 8230 .057 0.444 
Median Age -8114 6560 -.089 0.223 
Poverty 8702 8926 .125 0.336 
Prison 80.01 137.3 .056 0.563 
HS or More -2620 7845 -.042 0.740 
BS or More 3786 4531 .084 0.408 
State Control 30234 22064 .101 0.178 
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Table 2.2 Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures and Threat Variables on 
Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .583 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
Model 2.3/Table 2.3 displays the OLS regression for property crime employing threat 
variables and police expenditures as the expenditure variable. The results from Table 2.3 mirror 
those from the expenditure variables assessed in Table 2.1 and 2.2. Here, police expenditures are 
positively and significantly related to property crime controlling for various threat hypotheses 
and for political party control within a state. This result again contradicts the expectations of 
deterrence theory, as states with greater levels of police expenditures have higher levels of crime.  
None of the threat or political variables demonstrated a significant effect on property crime. 
Table 2.3 Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures and Threat Variables on 
Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .727, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
Variable b se β P 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.169 .036 .557 **0.000 
Unemployment 17722 11757 .161 0.140 
Median Age -11610 9535 -.127 0.230 
Poverty 5989 12977  .086 0.647 
Prison 227.97 201.78  .159 0.265 
HS or More -7751 11652  -.123 0.510 
BS or More 7660 6596  .170 0.252 
State Control 49938 32001  .166 0.127 
     
Variable b se Β p 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.576 .073 .745  **0.000 
Unemployment 11277 9240  .103 0.229 
Median Age -12034 7368  -.131 0.110 
Poverty 11260 10167  .161 0.275 
Prison 122.47 155.70  .085 0.436 
HS or More 555.64 9148  .008 0.952 
BS or More 3916 5168  .087 0.453 
State Control 38349.39 964954  .128 0.132 
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Table 2.4 displays the relationship of property crime and foreign born controlling for 
other threat variables. Foreign born is the only variable that is statistically significant in the 
model (p < 0.000), and indicates that as state populations hold more immigrants, property crime 
increases. Prior research on the relationship between immigration and crime has been 
inconsistent. Ousey and Kubrin (2017) recently reviewed that literature, and tested that 
relationship using meta-analysis. They found a weak, negative immigration-crime association.  
Typically, the immigration-crime relationship has been assessed as a crime causation argument 
which suggests that increased immigration or the presence of immigrants either increases or 
decreases the prevalence of crime. Theoretically, this is different than the threat hypothesis 
argument posed here, which suggests that a positive association between immigrants and crime 
may indicate an increased perception of minority group threat which, in turn, would increase 
crime through an expanded number of arrests. Whether the positive association noted here is an 
indicator of an increased perception of threat or an increase in factors that promote crime cannot 
be determined.  
 In sum, the models tested here indicated a relationship between three measures of 
criminal justice expenditures and property crime, as well as immigration and property crime.  
The criminal justice expenditures were opposite of the hypothesized effect derived from 
deterrence theory, while the immigration effect support a threat hypothesis.   
In the section that follows, political models predicting property crime rates are estimated. 
Those models include criminal justice expenditures along with political variables that measure 
the degree of democrat/republican control within states measuring the political party membership 
of governors, state legislators and US Senators. 
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Table 2.4 Effects of Foreign Born and Threat Variables on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .769 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Model 3: Political Models 
 The results displayed in Tables 3.1a and 3.1b show a statistically significant relationship 
between property crime and correction expenditures (β = .887/.877, p < .000).  As in the 
previously estimated corrections expenditure model, the effect is negative and rejects the 
hypothesis derived from deterrence theory. 
Table 3.1a also shows a significant effect of state legislative political party composition 
on property crime (β = .175, p < .05). The effect is in the positive direction, indicating that the 
more republican a state’s legislature, the higher the rate of property crime. Table 3.1b shows the 
effect for state political control which measures democrat/republican dominance across the 
governor’s office, state legislature and US Senate on crime. The effect was positive, indicating a 
higher crime rate in state’s with more republican control (β = .229, p < .05).  An independent test 
for the political party affiliation of the governor found no statistical significant effects in either 
model. 
 
 
Variable b Se Β p 
Foreign Born 102.17 11.95  .774 **0.000 
Unemployment 13439 8779  .122 0.134 
Median Age -4707 7197 -.051 0.517 
Poverty 11171 9698  .161 0.256 
Prison 226.43 149.42  .158 0.138 
HS or More 3087 8818  .049 0.728 
BS or More 4445 4898  .099 0.370 
State Control 24361 23939  .081 0.315 
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Table 3.1a. Effects of Corrections Direct Expenditures, State Legislative Composition,  
  and Governor Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .797, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 3.1b Effects of Correction Direct Expenditures, State Control, and Governor 
Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .792, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Tables 3.2a and 3.2b replicate the model in 3.1 a and b, substituting judicial expenditures 
for correctional expenditures and controlling for political party membership measures. As in the 
earlier models, judicial expenditures are found to be a significant predictor of property crime. 
The relationship, however, is in the unexpected direction, and reject deterrence theory 
arguments. 
Table 3.2a reveals that the state legislative variable is statistically significant (β = .262, p 
< .05), while Table 3.2b shows a statistically significant effect for state political party control.  
These results replicate those found when controlling for correctional expenditures. Here again, 
the effect is opposite of the hypothesized relationship, and the greater republican control within a 
state, the higher the crime rate.   
Variable b Se Β P 
Corrections D.E. .139 .010  .887 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
42689 16274  .175 *0.012 
Governor’s Party 9595 288880  .022 0.741 
     
Variable b Se β P 
Corrections D.E. .138 .010 .877 **0.000 
State Control 68893 28562 .229 *0.020 
Governor’s Party -45133 41071 -.105 0.278 
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Table 3.2a Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures, State Legislative 
Composition, and Governor Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .507, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 3.2b Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures, State Control, and 
Governor Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .515, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Tables 3.3a and b assess the effect of police expenditures on crime controlling for 
political party concentration measures. The results replicate the prior findings: police 
expenditures are positively related to the property crime rate, and political concentration 
measures indicate that the more republican a state, the higher the rate of property crime. These 
findings also reject the hypotheses these models were designed to test (related to deterrence 
theory and the effect of republican control on crime). 
 
 
Variable b Se β P 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.220 .031 .725  **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
64020 25800  .262 *0.017 
Governor’s Party 23636 44906  .055 0.601 
     
Variable b Se β P 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.219 .031  .721 **0.000 
State Control 117799 44281  .392 *0.011 
Governor’s Party -73906 63322  -.171 0.249 
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Table 3.3a Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures, State Legislative 
Composition, and Governor Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .720, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 3.3b Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures, State Control, and 
Governor Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 =.714, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Tables 3.4 a and b assess the foreign-born threat hypothesis controlling for political party 
concentration.  Confirming prior model estimates, foreign born was positively related to property 
crime rates supporting the threat hypothesis.  Consistent with the results from model 3.1 a and b 
and 3.2 a and b, political party concentration was positively related to crime, indicating that the 
more republican a state, the higher the rate of crime.  
  
Variable b Se β P 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.653 .059  .844 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
49491 19167  .203 *0.013 
Governor’s Party 32021 33776  .074 0.421 
     
Variable b Se β P 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.643 .060 .832  **0.000 
State Control 79606 33562  .265 *0.022 
Governor’s Party -31436 48160  -.073 0.517 
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Table 3.4a Effects of Foreign Born, State Legislative Composition, and Governor Party 
on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .743, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 3.4b Effects of Foreign Born, State Control, and Governor Party on Property 
Crime 
Note. R2 =.749, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Model 4: Reduced Form Property Crime Models 
 Based on the results from the prior property crime models, reduced form models for 
property crime fitted with only significant variables were estimated. As in the models above, 
there is a separate model for each criminal justice expenditure type, and one for foreign born.  
The other variables included in each model were poverty (measuring economic threat) and one of 
the political concentration measures for state legislature. The state legislature measures were 
employed because its effect was stronger than the overall political concentration measure in the 
models tested above. 
 The results of the reduced form estimates confirm the prior OLS estimates and present 
the most parsimonious model in each case. In each model, the criminal justice expenditure, 
poverty and the political control measure were significant and positively related to property 
Variable b Se Β P 
Foreign Born 114.16 9.80 .865 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
47344 18323 .194 *0.013 
Governor’s Party -15681 32725 -.029 0.700 
     
Variable b Se Β P 
Foreign Born 113.65  9.67  .861 **0.000 
State Control 88276 31470 .293 **0.007 
Governor’s Party -85829 45552 -.199 0.066 
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crime. As in previous models, the results rejected deterrence hypotheses, supported a class threat 
hypothesis, and rejected the hypothesis that crime would be lower in republican controlled states. 
 The efficiency of the models varied.  The most efficient model was produced using 
correctional expenditures (adjusted R2 = 81.8), followed by the police expenditure model 
(74.9%) and then the judicial expenditure model (55.33%).   
Table 4.1 Effects of Corrections Direct Expenditures, Poverty, and State Legislative 
Composition on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .818, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
  
 
Table 4.2 Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures, Poverty, and State 
Legislative Composition on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .553 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable b Se β p 
Corrections D.E. .137 .010 .875 **0.000 
Poverty 10120 4387 .145 *0.026 
State Legislative 
Composition 
37019 15321 .152 *0.020 
     
Variable b Se β p 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.221 .030 .726 **0.000 
Poverty 15307 6837 .220 *0.030 
State Legislative 
Composition 
56782 24350 .233 *0.024 
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Table 4.3 Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures, Poverty, and State 
Legislative Composition on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .7498 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 The final reduced form property crime equation is found in Table 4.4, which estimates 
the foreign born threat model controlling for the poverty threat hypothesis and the political 
control hypothesis. Here, all the variables were positively and significantly related to property 
crime. Those results suggest support for both the foreign born and poverty threat hypotheses but 
reject the political concentration hypothesis. Overall, the model is efficient, predicting 77.7% of 
the variation in property crime across states.  
Table 4.4 Effects of Foreign Born, Poverty, and State Legislative Composition on 
Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .777 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Violent Crime Analysis and Models 
 In this section, the models employed to predict property crime rates across states are re-
estimated using violent crime rates as the outcome. Doing so allows the hypotheses described 
earlier to be assessed for similar/differential effects across major crime types. Given that the 
Variable b se β p 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.648 .056 .837 **0.000 
Poverty 12795 5136 .184 *0.016 
State Legislative 
Composition 
44747 18050 .184 *0.017 
     
Variable B se β p 
Foreign Born 112.22 9.02 .850 **0.000 
Poverty 12781 4838 .184 *0.011 
State Legislative 
Composition 
37127 16952 .152 *0.034 
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hypotheses and general models examined here were reviewed in the property crime section, here 
minimal discussion will be presented to summarize the results and to note any differences 
between the property and violent crime model estimates. 
Model 5: Threat Hypothesis Models 
 The results for the first violent crime model were the same as those for the first property 
crime model (2.1 – 2.3).  Controlling for a variety of factors, the only significant predictors of 
violent crime across states were criminal justice expenditure variables. The effects were positive 
or unexpected, and rejected a deterrence hypothesis.  
Table 5.1 Effects of Corrections Direct Expenditures and Threat Variables on Violent 
Crime 
Note. R2 = .866, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
  
Variable B Se Β p 
Corrections D.E. .021 .002 .836 **0.000 
Unemployment 1247 1058 .072 0.245 
Median Age -1080 843.45 -.075 0.208 
Poverty 539.85 1147 .050 0.641 
Prison 5.67 17.66 .025 0.750 
HS or More -715.23 1008.691 -.073 0.482 
BS or More 291.37 582.73 .041 0.620 
State Control 2927 2837 .062 0.308 
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Table 5.2 Effects of Judicial and Legal Expenditures and Threat Variables on Violent 
Crime 
Note. R2 = .708, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 5.3 Effects of Police Protection Expenditures and Threat Variables on Violent 
Crime 
Note. R2 = .828, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05  
 
 Model 5.4 assessed the effect of the foreign born threat hypothesis on violent crime, and 
similar to the property crime model, the results were the same, and indicated a foreign-born 
threat effect. Unlike the property crime model, in Table 5.4 an effect is also noted for 
unemployment as a threat indicator. 
 
Variable B Se Β p 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.033 .005 .685 **0.000 
Unemployment 3010 1539 .175 0.058 
Median Age -1437 1248 -.100 0.257 
Poverty 258.98 1699 .024 0.880 
Prison 33.88 26.42 .151 0.207 
HS or More -957.83 1525 -.097 0.534 
BS or More 669.25 863.69 .095 0.442 
State Control 6301 162457 .134 0.140 
     
Variable B se Β p 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.098 .010 .808 **0.000 
Unemployment 2027 1212 .118 0.102 
Median Age -1705 966.68 -.119 0.085 
Poverty 1005 1333 .092 0.455 
Prison 12.85 20.43 .057 0.533 
HS or More -78.75 1200 -.008 0.948 
BS or More 265.63 678.09 .038 0.697 
State Control 4251 3274 .090 0.202 
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Table 5.4 Effects of Foreign Born and Threat Variables on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .864, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Model 6: Political Models 
 Models 6.1 (a/b), 6.2 (a/b), and 6. 3 (a/b) assess the effect of criminal justice expenditure 
by type on violence crime controlling for political party measures, while 6.4 (a/b) estimates the 
violent crime rate assessing the foreign born threat hypothesis controlling for political party 
measures. These models correspond with the property crime models found in Tables 3.1 (a/b), 
3.2 (a/b), 3.3 (a/b) and 3.4 (a/b). These results for the violent crime estimates are virtually 
identical to those for property crime, indicating that: (1) regardless of the specific measure of 
criminal justice expenditure employed, the deterrence hypothesis is rejected; (2) support for the 
foreign born threat hypothesis; and (3) rejection of the political party hypotheses which suggest 
an inverse relationship crime and republican control of political processes within a state.  
There were two interesting differences between the violent and property crime models.  
For every model, the models fit the violent crime data better, with increases in the adjusted R2 
between 6 to 20 percent. Compared to prior macro-level studies, this is somewhat unusual, and 
property crime rates are often more efficiently estimated at the macro-level. Second, in the 
foreign born threat model (6.4.b), an effect is found for the political party of the governor that 
Variable B Se Β p 
Foreign Born 17.62 1.43 .854 **0.000 
Unemployment 2370 1054 .138 *0.030 
Median Age -419.51 864.23 -.029 0.630 
Poverty 1021 1164 .094 0.385 
Prison 30.86 17.94 .138 0.093 
HS or More 442.30 1058 -.045 0.678 
BS or More 319.65 588.14 .045 0.590 
State Control 1817 2874 .039 0.531 
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was not seen in any of the prior estimates. Here, governor is negatively related to violent crime, 
meaning that states with a democratic governor have a lower violent crime rate. It should be 
noted, however, that like the other statistically significant political party measure outcomes, this 
result rejects the hypothesis that crime is lower in states with more extensive republican control.   
Table 6.1a Effects of Corrections Direct Expenditures, State Legislative Composition, 
and Governor Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .863, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 6.1b Effects of Correction Direct Expenditures, State Control, and Governor 
Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .859, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 6.2a Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures, State Legislative 
Composition, and Governor Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .649, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
Variable b Se β P 
Corrections D.E. .023 .001 .929  **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
5027 2087  .132 *0.020 
Governor’s Party 263.29 3704  .003 0.944 
 
Variable b Se β P 
Corrections D.E. .023 .001 .922 **0.000 
State Control 7478 3687 .159 *0.049 
Governor’s Party -5523 5302  -.082 0.303 
 
Variable b Se β P 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.039 .004 .824 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
9017 3407 .236 *0.011 
Governor’s Party 2209 5930 .033 0.711 
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Table 6.2b Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures, State Control, and 
Governor Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .653, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 6.3a Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures, State Legislative 
Composition, and Governor Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .801, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 6.3b Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures, State Control, and 
Governor Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .794, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
  
  
Variable b Se β P 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.039 .004 .819 **0.000 
State Control 16232 5863 .345 **0.008 
Governor’s Party -11155 8384 -.165 0.190 
 
Variable b Se β p 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.109 .008 .897 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
6189 252 .162 0.018 
Governor’s Party 3903 4450 .058 0.385 
 
Variable b Se β p 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.107 .008 .886 **0.000 
State Control 9274 4451 .197 *0.043 
Governor’s Party -3326 6387 -.049 0.605 
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Table 6.4a Effects of Foreign Born, State Legislative Composition, and Governor Party 
on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .844, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 6.4b Effects of Foreign Born, State Control, and Governor Party on Violent 
Crime 
Note. R2 = .846, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Model 7: Reduced Form Violent Crime Models 
 The following reduced crime models (Tables 7.1-7.4) present very similar results to those 
derived from the property crime reduced form models. The main differences here are not 
substantive, but rather relate to the increased percentage of variation in violent crime across 
states predicted by these models compared to the property crime models. Essentially, these 
finding confirm the main prior results: (1) expenditures are positively associated with violent 
crime, rejecting the deterrence hypothesis; (2) Republican control is positively related to violent 
crime, rejecting the political party control hypothesis; and (3) evidence supporting a threat 
hypothesis related to foreign born and poverty are evident. 
  
Variable b se Β p 
Foreign Born 19.15 1.19 .928 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
5860 2237 .154 *0.012 
Governor’s Party -3622 3996 -.054 0.370 
 
Variable b se Β p 
Foreign Born 19.08 1.18 .924 **0.000 
State Control 10746 3853 .229 **0.008 
Governor’s Party -12487 557 -.185 *0.030 
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Table 7.1 Effects of Corrections Direct Expenditures, Poverty, and State Legislative 
Composition on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .875, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 7.2 Effects of Judicial and Legal Direct Expenditures, Poverty, and State 
Legislative Composition on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .683, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 7.3 Effects of Police Protection Direct Expenditures, Poverty, and State 
Legislative Composition on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .820, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
  
Variable b Se β p 
Corrections D.E. .023 .001 .920 **0.000 
Poverty 1174 568.05 .108 *0.044 
State Legislative 
Composition 
4263 1983 .112 *0.069 
     
Variable b Se β p 
Judicial and 
Legal D.E. 
.039 .004 .824 **0.000 
Poverty 2017 901.65 .185 *0.030 
State Legislative 
Composition 
7945 3211 .208 *0.017 
     
Variable b Se β p 
Police Protection 
D.E. 
.108 .007 .891 **0.000 
Poverty 1607 679.99 .148 *0.022 
State Legislative 
Composition 
5578 2389 .146 *0.024 
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Table 7.4 Effects of Foreign Born, Poverty, and State Legislative Composition on 
Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .863 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Model 8: An Alternative Collinearity Model: Total Criminal Justice Direct Expenditures 
 Due to collinearity in the initial models, above, criminal justice expenditures were 
estimated separately. The benefit of that approach is it allow assessment of the independent 
effect of each type of criminal justice expenditure on crime rates across states. An alternative to 
that approach is aggregating the types of criminal justice expenditures into total criminal justice 
expenditures. In this section, the results of regressions examining the total criminal justice 
expenditure measure are briefly reviewed to determine whether there is any substantial 
differences between a total expenditure and the specific expenditure models estimated and 
reviewed above. These models appear in Tables 8.1 through 10. In sum, these results are 
substantively similar to those obtained employing the individual criminal justice system 
expenditures, and the differences here related to overall model fit, which varies in these Tables 
depending on the criminal justice reference category from the prior tables employed for 
comparative purposes.  
  
Variable b Se β p 
Foreign Born 18.81 1.11 .911 **0.000 
Poverty 1602 593.50 .147 **0.010 
State Legislative 
Composition 
4323 2079 .113 *0.43 
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Table 8.1 Effects of Total Criminal Justice System Direct Expenditures and Threat  
  Variables on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .748 N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 9.1a Effects of Total Criminal Justice System Direct Expenditures, State 
Legislative Composition, and Governor Party on Property Crime 
Note. R2 = .731, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Table 9.1b Effects of Total Criminal Justice System Direct Expenditures, State Control, 
and Governor Party on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .728, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Variable B Se β p 
Total Criminal 
Justice D.E. 
.072 .009 .740 **0.000 
Unemployment 9959 9238 .091 0.287 
Median Age -9120 7406 -.100 0.225 
Poverty 9051 10099 .130 0.375 
Prison 141.97 155.31 .099 0.366 
HS or More -1654 8999 -.026 0.855 
BS or More 4191 5140 .093 0.420 
State Control 37777 24883 .126 0.137 
     
Variable B Se β p 
Total Criminal 
Justice D.E. 
.083 .007 .853 **0.000 
State Legislative 
Composition 
52214 18798 .214 **0.008 
Governor’s Party 15467 33183 .036 0.643 
 
Variable B Se β p 
Total Criminal 
Justice D.E. 
.082 .007 .842 **0.000 
State Control 87723 32746 .292 **0.010 
Governor’s Party -55184 2733 -.128 0.247 
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Table 10.1 Effects of Total Criminal Justice System Expenditures, Poverty, and State 
Legislative Composition on Violent Crime 
Note. R2 = .875, N = 49, **p < .01, *p < .05 
Variable B se β p 
Total Criminal 
Justice D.E. 
.014 .001 .920 **0.000 
Poverty 1471 623.16 .108 *0.023 
State Legislative 
Composition 
5810 2189 .112 *0.011 
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Chapter V: Summary and Conclusion 
 It is often argued that criminals can be deterred, and crime reduced through the use of 
formal social control mechanisms such as the expansion of police presence or the size of the 
criminal justice system. It is often argued that political parties respond differently to crime, and it 
is often assumed but not empirically assessed that different political parties respond to crime 
using different approaches, and that republicans are tougher on crime. These latter assumptions 
would suggest that crime should be lower in locations where there is a greater political 
concentration of republican leaders. Finally, as noted early, others have argued that the control of 
crime is also a form of political-social control which responds to perceived threats presented, for 
example, by low-income groups or racial or ethnic minorities. The present study addressed these 
various arguments using cross-sectional crime, criminal justice expenditure and demographic 
across US states. 
Criminal justice expenditures, the expansion of policing or the increased use of 
imprisonment involves political decision making. These decisions may reflect attitudes toward 
what are assumed to be the “best” methods for controlling crime held by members of different 
political parties (i.e., democrats versus republicans). It is assumed the republicans are more 
punitive and conservative than democrats, which may imply that republican oriented and 
controlled states should have lower crime rates than democratically controlled state. Decisions 
about funding and expanding the criminal justice process may be affected by other factors as 
well. Blalock’s minority and economic threat hypothesis argues that politicians use criminal 
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justice expenditures as a form of social control to reduce perceived threats to power. As noted, 
the current study examined these arguments by assessing the connection between criminal justice 
expenditures, political party concentrations and the presence of various populations perceived as 
presenting threats to the powerful and crime rates across states.  
 The present study was designed to examine the variations in criminal justice expenditures 
across states in relation to crime, measures of political party membership, and several control 
variables that also attempt to explain both property and violent crime. The year, 2009, was 
chosen for the analysis. Data in the present were collected by Olugbenga Ajilore (2016) for the 
year 2009 and supplemented with other state level data. The Ajilore dataset is one of the few 
datasets that has reliable criminal justice expenditure data across states, which is also 
disaggregated by type. Criminal justice expenditure data is actually quite difficult to collect 
across states and is not widely available across states particularly over consecutive years/time. 
The independent and control variables were drawn from several different sources that are 
displayed in Table 1.1. The dependent variables in the current study are property crime and 
violent crime; the independent variables are correctional direct expenditures, judicial and legal 
direct expenditures, police protection expenditures, state legislative composition, state control, 
and governor’s party. The control variables are imprisonment, population age, unemployment 
rate, poverty rate, education, and foreign born.  
Several of the independent variables were found to be highly correlated. The variable, 
foreign born was highly correlated with the criminal justice expenditures, specifically the 
corrections direct expenditures. Moreover, the criminal justice expenditure measures for different 
segments of the criminal justice system were also highly correlated. To address this issue, 
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foreign born and the individual criminal justice expenditure variables were used in a separate 
model as independent variables to model variations in crime rates across states. 
 The type of regression used in the current study is an OLS regression of each criminal 
justice expenditure on crime in three models: expenditure/threat hypothesis models; 
expenditure/political party model, and reduced form models. Three equations were estimated for 
each model to help assess the effects of the independent and control variables on property and 
violent crime independently. The criminal justice expenditures were used in separate models due 
to collinearity. Models for total criminal justice expenditures were also estimated to address 
collinearity between individual criminal justice expenditure measures.  
The findings across all models yielded very similar results for all the criminal justice 
expenditures in both the property crime and violent crime models. Findings indicate that all 
criminal justice expenditures had a positive, statistically significant relationship with both 
property and violent crime. The sign of the relationships, however, were in the unexpected 
direction, and rejected deterrence hypotheses.  
 The results also indicated that republican political party concentration was related to 
crime compared to democratic states. Contrary to expectations, republican controlled states had 
higher crime rates for both property and violent crime. This finding was consistent across all the 
models estimated in the present study. 
 Several threat hypothesis variables were assessed across the various models. A persistent 
threat effect was found between foreign born and crime; as the percent of foreign born increased, 
so too did crime, which could indicate that the volume of crime may be an effort to control the 
perceived threat posed by foreign born populations. Most of the remaining threat variables were 
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insignificant. In certain cases, an effect was found for poverty, and in a few cases, for 
unemployment, but these threat effects were not consistent across all models.  
 The political variable also showed similar results across all models, for both property and 
violent crimes estimates. With one exception, the relationship between political party measures 
and crime were positive, indicating that the more political control republicans had within a state, 
the higher the rate of crime. These findings fail to reject the hypothesis that politics have an 
effect on crime but rejected the hypothesis that Republican states have a negative relationship 
with crime.  
 Furthermore, the reduced crime models also shared similar findings across criminal 
justice expenditures and property and violent crime. The models indicate that state legislative 
and poverty is statistically significant in each model. Collectively, the results indicate that the 
more Republicans a state has in legislation, the more that social control is implicated through 
correction expenditures, increasing poverty as property and violent crime increases. This is 
consistent with other researches that find that poverty is a threat variable or possibly a result of 
social control by the majority race, translating to the majority party in the current research. The 
findings support and fail to reject the power hypothesis, economic hypothesis. 
 The results require further research to assess some of the outcomes in greater detail. For 
example, there was a persistent foreign born and republican effect on crime. In the presence 
study, the relationship between these variables was not specifically modeled. This raises question 
about whether, for example, republican states might attempt to control crime and perceived 
threats by increasing criminal justice expenditures.  
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 It is widely recognized that the criminal justice process is affected by political decision 
making of various types. For example, legislators determine the penalties that attach to criminal 
behaviors, as well as which behaviors will be counted as crimes in the criminal law. Legislators 
also affect the funding of the criminal justice system. In the present study, I examined the 
independent effects of political party membership across states on levels of crime, and the 
independent effects of criminal justice expenditures on crime across states. However, it is likely 
that these two processes are related to one another, and measuring the relationship between 
political party composition, criminal justice expenditures, and crime requires the use of more 
complicated methods than apply in the present study. Those methods would require the use of 
time series data across states or other levels of analysis, such as the city level to model correctly. 
As a result, the preliminary findings from the study which suggest that republican states have 
more crime than democratic states may reflect voters transitioning to support republicans more 
over time when crime rates remain high. Again, testing this possibility requires the use of time 
series data that allows levels of crime and the changes in political party representation to be 
related to one another. There are several limitations of the present study which relate to the time 
and variables utilized. Due to only focusing on one year, the data may not fully represent how 
politics affect crime across years. As a result, the study’s results may not be generalized across 
other segments of time.  
This study also failed to utilize variables that measure other factors that impact rates of 
criminal offending, and variables which may also be important for a more complete 
understanding of the relationship between politics, crime, and the criminal justice system. For 
example, political variables that might be of utility of such studies will include registered voters, 
voting results, or African American legislators. The absence of these variables may cause the 
58 
 
study to be less accurate when analyzing the results of each model and relating them to prior 
research findings. 
 Lastly, future research should implement the variables previously mentioned as well as 
conduct a longitudinal study to reveal more accurate findings. However, it will be difficult as 
many states have missing information in prior years in relation to their political compositions, 
registered voters, and expenditures. The effects of politics may change or become more 
significant when the African American legislator variable is included. Also, the registered voter’s 
variable may provide more information of the state populations that may have higher or lower 
crime rates. The findings of the study can be replicated and should be extended as the lack of 
research done in this area is an issue. 
 In conclusion, political party membership across states was shown to be related to the 
level of crime. It was found that controlling for the type and level of criminal justice 
expenditures, states with greater republican control had higher levels of crime. This finding 
suggests that the “get-tough” strategies preferred by Republicans and assumed to reduce crime 
may not work as advertised. It was also found that states with higher levels of criminal justice 
expenditures had higher levels of crime. Logically, this makes sense to the extent that controlling 
a larger volume of crime requires additional criminal justice expenditures. However, that finding 
suggests that expanding the criminal justice system does not necessarily lead to a reduction in 
crime, but further longitudinal test of this relationship need to be undertaken. Finally, the study 
also found evidence in support of the minority threat hypothesis, when that threat was measured 
by the percent of residents in a state that are foreign born. Other threats such as an economic 
threat which was measured in the present study through the use of poverty and unemployment 
indicators were not found to be related to crime. Overall, the findings from this study question 
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some traditional assumptions about factors that generate crime, such as the relationship between 
politics, “get-tough” approaches and crime, and assumptions about factors that deter criminal 
behavior. 
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